2019 Southern Libya offensive
House of Representatives (HoR) *Libyan National Army SLM/A (alleged) Co-belligerents: | combatant2 = Government of National Accord (GNA) *Libyan Army Allied forces: NSG loyalists Tuareg militias Toubou militias Chadian rebels | combatant3 = * Libyan Provinces ---- AQIM | commander1 = Khalifa Haftar (LNA supreme commander) | commander2 = Fayez al-Sarraj (Head of unity government) Ali KannaSerraj appoints Shareef as new Chief of Staff and Juha as his Assistant. Libya Herald. Published 14 February 2019. (Southern military zone) Ahmed al-Ataybi Muhammad Omar Hassan (166th Battalion) Salah Badi (Al-Sumud Front) | commander3 = Al-Mahdi Rajab Dungo | units1 = Libyan National Army *Tariq Ben Zeyad Battalion *166th Infantry Brigade *177th Brigade *160th Battalion *Sudanese mercenaries (alleged) ---- French Air Force (only against Chadian rebels) | units2 = Libyan Army *6th Infantry Unit *166th Battalion *Southern Protection ForcesProfazio, Umberto (15 March 2019). Push for southern Libya tests ethnic ties and regional alliances. International Institute for Strategic Studies. *Petroleum Facilities Guard NSG loyalists *Al-Sumud Front Chadian rebels *URF *CCMSR | units3 = Military of ISIL * Chadian militants (alleged) | campaignbox = }} In late January 2019, the Libyan National Army (LNA) faction of Marshal Khalifa Haftar launched an offensive to take control of the city of Sabha and the rest of southern Libya from the internationally recognised Government of National Accord (GNA) and local factions. Officially the LNA announced that the reason for the operation was to remove terrorists, Chadian rebel groups, and to secure the border, but it has expanded Haftar's territorial control and acquired him oil fields near Sabha. It has also restarted some interethnic conflicts as the LNA has allied with local Arab tribes, while the Tuareg and Toubou tribal militias are loyal to the GNA. Megerisi, Tarek (1 April 2019). While You Weren't Looking, General Haftar Has Been Taking Over Libya. Foreign Policy.Wintour, Patrick (8 February 2019). Conflict erupts for control of Libya's largest oil field. The Guardian. Background Khalifa Haftar's Libyan National Army (LNA) had previously deployed forces to southern Libya, but not on the same scale. An LNA spokesperson stated that the objective was to "secure the southwest from terrorist elements of Al-Qaeda, ISIS and rogue bandits involved in kidnapping, extortion and smuggling and threaten to change the topography of southern Libya." Additionally they intended to "secure key-strategic oil and gas installations, Man-made river (MMR) stations and ensure deliverance of services, fuel and gas to citizens." The LNA deployed multiple units to the area in mid-January 2019. Libyan army announces launch of anti-terror military operation in southern Libya. Xinhua. Published 15 January 2019. Most of the region has been under the control of various local Arab, Tuareg, and Toubou tribes, with Chadian and Sudanese groups also being present. Many of these were nominally loyal to the UN-backed GNA government in Tripoli.Eastern Libya government delegation visits key southern city of Sabha. Reuters. Published 28 January 2019. Offensive Battle of Sabha The LNA began taking positions near Sabha on 15 January. The Libya Observer|website=www.libyaobserver.ly|language=en|access-date=4 February 2019}} On 18 January, the LNA reportedly carried out a raid against AQIM and Libyan militants of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) northwest of Sabha, claiming to have killed at least three notable terrorists, including Al-Mahdi Rajab Dungo (Islamic State Minister of Defence for Libya). These claims were not independently corroborated, and remained disputed. Furthermore, clashes between the LNA and rival militias continued inside the city, while Sabha's airport remained under GNA control. Negotiations began between local militias and the LNA about a peaceful handover of the entire town to the LNA. Four members of the LNA's 128th brigade were killed in an ambush on 1 February near Sabha by Toubou tribesmen.Dignity Operation armed groups ambushed in southern Libya. Libya Observer. Published 1 February 2019. On 4 February, the GNA retreated from Sabha. According to GNA commander Ahmed al-Ataybi, Fayez al-Sarraj was not providing enough support to his forces, resulting in the withdrawal. The Libya Observer reported that there had been incidents of looting by the LNA. The Libya Observer|website=www.libyaobserver.ly|language=en|access-date=4 February 2019}} Fighting for the oil fields and countryside As the LNA advanced, Chadian rebel groups which had been based in the area came under increasing pressure. One faction, the URF, consequently decided to move from Libya back to Chad on 3–6 February 2019, hoping to launch an insurgency there. Instead, the URF was bombed by the French Air Force on the request of the Chadian government, and was forced to disperse. France, Chad, and the Libyan HoR had previously cooperated against the Chadian militants, as they consider them a destabilizing element in the region. The Chadian insurgents of the CCMSR accused Haftar of outright allying with the Chadian government to defeat them amid the offensive in southern Libya. On February 6, the GNA appointed Ali Kanna, a Tuareg militia leader, as the commander of the southern military zone, which includes most of Fezzan.Carlino, Ludovico (7 February 2019). Appointment of anti-LNA commander in southern Libya indicates Tripoli’s intent to recover territory taken by the LNA. Jane's. His Tuareg forces had originally fought for the Qaddafi government during the 2011 civil war and were originally from Mali. He made a deal with Prime Minister Fayez al-Sarraj, head of the Government of National Accord, in exchange for fighting Khalifa Haftar's LNA offensive.Dabbashi: Ali Kanna wanted to grant Libyan nationality to Malian Tuaregs in 2011. Address Libya. Published 7 February 2019. Since the, he attempted to unify the local Tuareg and Toubou militias against Haftar. The LNA and the pro-GNA forces contested several key oil fields in the region, which were closed since December 2018 by the Libyan National Oil Corporation. Fighting broke out over the al-Sharara oil field, about 560 kilometres south of Tripoli, on 8 February. On thxt day, Haftar declared southern Libya a no-fly zone.Libya: Haftar forces announce no-fly zone in south. Middle East Monitor. Published 9 February 2019. The al-Sharara field was secured by the LNA without any losses by 11 February. In the middle of the month the LNA began advancing to another one, al-Feel, and by 14 February was negotiating with GNA-aligned Toubou militants that controlled the oil field. They were also blocking the LNA's advance on to the city of Murzuq.Jamal Adel, Tom Westcott (14 February 2019). Warring forces in Libya's south deadlocked as LNA seeks control of oil field. Middle East Eye. The Chadian government closed its border with Libya in early March, officially to prevent Chadian rebels from crossing the border. As the desert border was impossible to control, the real aim of the announcement remained unclear; observers noted, however, that it coincided with the LNA offensive in southern Libya. After Haftar's forces launched a major offensive to capture Tripoli and northwestern Libya in early April, some forces in southern Libya which had previously been opposed to both HoR as well as GNA allied themselves with the latter to counter Haftar's increasing power. One of these militias was the Islamist al-Sumud Front, led by Salah Badi, which had been loyal to the old National Salvation Government (NSG). Haftar also sent some LNA groups that were active in the south to the northwest to aid his assault on Tripoli, weakening the HoR's power around Sabha. ISIL's Libyan affiliates took advantage of this, attacking Fuqaha on 9 April. At this point, the offensive in the south had fizzled out. Aftermath On 4 May, militants attacked a LNA military base near Sabha, killing seven to eleven soldiers of the 160th Battalion. The identity of the attackers remained disputed, as ISIL claimed responsibility, whereas the LNA blamed both Islamic State forces as well as Chadian insurgents. Furthermore, two other groups also claimed to have carried out the attack: The 166th Battalion, a pro-GNA unit, and the al-Sumud Front. Afterward, ISIL increased its rate of attacks in southern Libya, exploiting the volatile situation created by the LNA' offensive against Tripoli: Ghadwa was raided on 9 May, and the Zella oilfield was attacked on 18 May. Notes References Category:Conflicts in 2019 Category:2019 in Libya Category:Military operations of the Second Libyan Civil War